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MARTEL V. MONTANA POWER COMPANY:




Basing its decision on the bold proclamation that "Montana
juries can and should be trusted with the information about the
consequences of their verdicts,"' the Montana Supreme Court in
Martel v. Montana Power Co.2 ruled that a jury could compare "all
forms of conduct amounting to negligence" and should be "in-
formed of the effect of its verdict."3 The court specifically over-
ruled the holding in Derenberger v. Lutey4 that conduct amount-
ing to ordinary negligence could not be compared to willful or
wanton conduct under Montana's comparative-negligence statute.'
The court also reversed its long-standing tradition of not informing
juries of the effect of comparative negligence. This decision to in-
form juries of the effect of comparative negligence brings Montana
in line with a developing national trend favoring informed juries."
This note first traces the development of comparative negli-
gence in Wisconsin, the jurisdiction from which Montana borrowed
its statute. Second, the note discusses the historical development
of comparative negligence in Montana and evaluates the court's ra-
tionale in allowing comparison of all kinds of conduct." Third, the
note analyzes the Montana Supreme Court's decision to instruct
juries as to the effect of comparative negligence. Finally, the note
* The author would like to thank Greg Munro, Professor, School of Law, University of
Montana, Missoula, Montana, for his assistance and insightful commentary. This paper also
benefitted from a paper authored by Carol Donaldson, student, School of Law, University of
Montana, Missoula, Montana. Any errors or omissions, however, are strictly the author's.
1. Martel v. Montana Power Co., 231 Mont. 96, 752 P.2d 140 (1988).
2. Id. at 100, 752 P.2d at 143.
3. Id. at 106, 752 P.2d at 146.
4. 207 Mont. 1, 674 P.2d 485 (1983).
5. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (1989).
6. H. WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT, § 18:2 (2d ed. 1987).
7. For the purpose of this paper, "kinds of conduct" refer to "all forms of conduct
amounting to negligence in any form including but not limited to ordinary negligence, gross
negligence, willful negligence, wanton misconduct, reckless conduct, and heedless conduct."
Martel, 231 Mont. at 100, 752 P.2d at 143. Some jurisdictions outside Montana have devel-
oped "degrees of negligence" in lieu of "kinds of negligence." See Draney v. Bachman, 138
N.J. Super. 503, 351 A.2d 409 (1976). "The thought is that the difference between willful
and wanton misconduct and ordinary negligence is one of kind rather than degree in that
the former involves conduct of an entirely different order . Derenberger, 207 Mont. at
13, 674 P.2d at 491. 1
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highlights particular problems that could result in the area of pu-
nitive damages and proposes a solution to those problems that is
consistent with the ideals propounded in Martel.
II. FACTS
During the early evening hours of July 7, 1979, nineteen-year-
old Terry Hawthorne Martel and three friends drove to Montana
Power Company's (MPC) Old Piedmont Substation south of
Whitehall, Montana.8 The substation's forty-foot metal tower sup-
ports electrical lines carrying 100,000 volts of electricity.'
After he drank two beers, Martel climbed to the top of the
tower after one of his friends had also climbed the tower.10 Witness
testimony conflicted over whether he licked his fingers before he
reached toward an electrical line and said, "watch this."" In any
event, when he was five to ten inches from the line, electricity
arced, causing third-degree burns over thirty-six percent of his
body. 1 2
MPC purchased the tower in 1974 and, after performing an
initial inspection of the tower, determined that it complied with
the National Electric Safety Code.13 In 1975 and 1976, MPC for-
mally inspected the tower.1 ' Additionally, an employee drove by
and examined the substation and tower at least monthly. 5
The substation tower consisted of crisscrossed metal brackets
and rested on a concrete footing planted in the ground. 6 No barri-
cades surrounded the footing to prevent access." Near the tower, a
wooden sign-once painted over, but still legible-displayed the
word "danger."1 8
Near the closing of Martel's case-in-chief, the judge ruled that
Martel had established a prima facie case of MPC's willful or wan-
ton misconduct.1 9 Based on this initial ruling, the judge later in-
structed the jury that it could find that MPC acted willfully or
8. Martel, 231 Mont. at 98, 752 P.2d at 142.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Brief for Appellant at 7, Martel v. Montana Power Co., 231 Mont. 96, 752 P.2d 140
(1988) (No. 85-251).
12. Martel, 231 Mont. at 99, 752 P.2d at 142.
13. Brief for Respondent at 5, Martel v. Montana Power Co., 231 Mont. 96, 752 P.2d
140 (1988) (No. 85-251).
14. Id.
15. Id.
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wantonly toward Martel2 0 Although willful or wanton misconduct
had been established, the judge denied Martel's proposed Jury In-
struction Number 48.21 This instruction, based on the holding in
Derenberger,22 stated that comparative negligence did not apply if
the defendant had acted willfully or wantonly and the plaintiff had
been only ordinarily negligent.2 3
By special verdict, the jury found Martel seventy-five percent
negligent and MPC twenty-five percent negligent.14 The jury set
total damages at $200,000.25 On March 13, 1985, the judge denied
Martel's motion for a new trial.2
After the court denied Martel a new trial, he appealed to the
Montana Supreme Court, contending, in part, that because he had
proved MPC's willful and wanton conduct, the trial court erred
when it declined to instruct the jury that comparative negligence
did not apply. 7 Again citing Derenberger, Martel's attorney de-
nounced the trial court for refusing to instruct the jury that the
court would reduce Martel's damage award if the jury found him
negligent.2"
III. HOLDING
Overruling Derenberger, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court's decision disallowing Jury Instruction Number 48.29
The court stated that "all forms of conduct amounting to negli-
gence in any form including but not limited to ordinary negligence,
gross negligence, willful negligence, wanton misconduct, reckless
conduct, and heedless conduct, are to be compared with any con-
duct that falls short of conduct intended to cause injury or
damage." 30





24. Special Verdict, Martel v. Montana Power Co., (5th Jud. Dist. Ct., Jefferson
County, Jan. 25, 1985) (Cause No. 7182).
25. Id. Note: A discrepancy exists in the amount of damages awarded in Martel. The
reported case states damages of $290,000, the Special Verdict $200,000, and Appellant's
Brief $250,000.
26. Order Denying Motion for a New Trial, Martel v. Montana Power Co., (5th Jud.
Dist. Ct., Jefferson County, Mar. 13, 1985) (Cause No. 7182).
27. Martel, 231 Mont. at 98, 752 P.2d at 141.
28. Brief for Appellant at 8, 18-25, Martel v. Montana Power Co., 231 Mont. 96, 752
P.2d 140 (1988) (No. 85-251).
29. Martel, 251 Mont. at 99, 752 P.2d at 142.
30. Id. at 100, 752 P.2d at 143.
3
Velk: Martel v. Montana Power Company: Liberating and Enlightening the Montana Comparative-Negligence Jury
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1990
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
effect of comparative negligence on its verdict31 and adopting the
Idaho Supreme Court's reasoning in Seppi v. Betty,3 2 the Montana
Supreme Court held: "Upon the request of a party, the court must
[inform the jury of the effect of comparative negligence] unless it
finds the issue so complex as to confuse the jury.""
IV. EVALUATION OF THE COURT'S REASONING
A. Development of Comparative Negligence in Montana
1. Origin and Forms of Comparative Negligence
Forty-four states have adopted a form of comparative negli-
gence either by statute or through case law.3' The effect of compar-
ative negligence in a particular jurisdiction depends on whether
the courts follow a pure or modified form of comparative negli-
gence. 5 The pure form, which the Mississippi Supreme Court im-
plemented in 1910,6 provides that a plaintiff recovers the amount
of damages proportionate to the defendant's negligence regardless
of the extent of the plaintiff's own negligence. 7
In 1931, Wisconsin developed modified comparative negli-
gence,38 which generally has two forms: "less than" and "not
greater than." In "less than" jurisdictions, the plaintiff recovers
only if his or her negligence is less than the defendant's.3 9 For ex-
ample, if a court finds a plaintiff and defendant each fifty-percent
negligent, then the plaintiff's negligence is not less than the de-
fendant's and the plaintiff, therefore, recovers nothing. In "not
greater than" jurisdictions, the plaintiff recovers only if his or her
negligence is not greater than the defendant's.' Therefore, in the
31. Id. at 105, 752 P.2d at 146.
32. 99 Idaho 186, 579 P.2d 683 (1978).
33. Martel, 231 Mont. 106, 752 P.2d at 146.
34. H. WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT, § 1.11 (2d ed. 1987). Six states-Alabama, Dela-
ware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia-have not enacted the doc-
trine of comparative negligence. Id. Maryland, however, allows comparative negligence in
the area of strict liability by recognizing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977).
Phipps v. General Motor Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976). North Carolina also
makes an exception allowing comparative negligence to railroad employees engaged in intra-
state commerce. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-242(c) (1982). Virginia makes two exceptions and al-
lows comparative negligence to railroad employees in intrastate commerce, VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-58 (1982), and to railroad-crossing accidents when the statutory signals are not given,
VA. CODE Ann. § 56-416 (1986).
35. Id. at §§ 1:11.
36. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972).
37. H. WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT app. at 657.
38. 1931 Wis. Laws 242.
39. H. WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT § 4:3 (2d ed 1987).
40. Id. at § 4:4.
[Vol. 51
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example above, the plaintiff who is fifty-percent negligent will re-
cover fifty percent of his or her damages because the plaintiff's
negligence is not greater than the defendant's. Wisconsin currently
follows a "not greater than" form of comparative negligence,41
which Montana subsequently adopted. 42 To understand fully Mon-
tana's system, one must examine Wisconsin's experience.
2. Wisconsin's Development of Comparative Negligence
Before 1931, the Wisconsin Supreme Court followed the doc-
trine of contributory negligence, which bars a plaintiff guilty of
any negligence, no matter how slight, from recovering damages. 48
The Wisconsin Supreme Court developed several doctrines to re-
duce the harshness of contributory negligence. One doctrine to
mitigate such harshness consisted of allowing the court to compare
what will be termed "kinds of conduct." Such kinds of conduct in-
clude: willful conduct, wanton conduct, gross misconduct, and
reckless conduct." When a plaintiff could prove that a defendant
had been grossly negligent and the plaintiff only ordinarily negli-
gent, then the different kinds of conduct prevented application of
contributory negligence and the plaintiff recovered all proven
damages.45
In 1931, Wisconsin replaced contributory negligence with a
system of comparative negligence.' From 1931 through 1962, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, mistakenly held that different
kinds of conduct could not be compared under comparative negli-
gence. 47 In other words, different kinds of conduct, which were de-
veloped under contributory negligence, survived and allowed cir-
cumvention of the doctrine of comparative negligence whenever a
court ruled that a defendant's conduct differed in kind from that
of the plaintiff.
In Wisconsin's 1962 landmark case of Bielski v. Schulze," the
court held that a jury may compare all the various kinds of plain-
tiff's conduct with all the various kinds of defendant's conduct. In
deciding Bielski, the court deemed as faulty the application of
kinds of conduct to a system of comparative negligence, because it
41. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1983).
42. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (1989).
43. Astin v. Chicago, M & St. P. R.R., 143 Wis. 477, 128 N.W. 265 (1910).
44. See Barlow v. Foster, 149 Wis. 613, 136 N.W. 822 (1912).
45. Astin, 143 Wis. at 485, 128 N.W. at 268-69.
46. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (1931).
47. See Tomasik v. Lanferman, 206 Wis. 94, 97, 238 N.W. 857, 858 (1931); Twist v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 275 Wis. 174, 180-81, 81 N.W.2d 523, 527 (1957).
48. 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
5
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allowed the same harsh all-or-nothing verdicts that existed under
contributory negligence."9
The Wisconsin Supreme Court also concluded that a judge
should not inform a jury that comparative negligence affects a
damage award.50 The court reasoned that sympathy for an injured
plaintiff could encourage jurors to manipulate their calculations of
negligence to ensure an injured plaintiff's recovery.5 1 Before one
analyzes the Wisconsin rule against informing juries, however, a
discussion of Montana's development of comparative negligence is
necessary.
3. Montana's Development of Comparative Negligence
Montana followed the doctrine of contributory negligence un-
til 197552 when it adopted Wisconsin's "not greater than" modified
form of comparative negligence." A well-known rule of statutory
construction provides that when the Montana Supreme Court
adopted Wisconsin's statute, the court also adopted the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's interpretation of that statute. 4 Following this
rule, as enunciated in Dunham v. Southside National Bank,55 the
Montana Supreme Court presumably agreed that a court should
not inform a jury of the effect of comparative negligence on a
verdict.
Before adopting comparative negligence, Montana developed
different kinds of conduct to lessen the severity of contributory
negligence.56 Although Wisconsin initially applied different kinds
of conduct to its comparative-negligence statute, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court realized its error and abandoned kinds of conduct
in 1962. 7 After adopting comparative negligence in 1975, however,
the Montana Supreme Court did not rule on the status of different
kinds of conduct under comparative negligence for five years. Fol-
lowing the rule in Dunham, the court should have abolished kinds
49. Id. at 16, 114 N.W.2d at 112-13.
50. Fehrman v. Smirl, 20 Wis. 2d 1, 121 N.W.2d 255 (1963).
51. Id. at 19, 121 N.W.2d at 265.
52. See Comment, Comparative Negligence in Montana, 37 MONT. L. REV. 152 (1976)
(authored by Mae Nan Ellingson), for a brief history of contributory and comparative negli-
gence in Montana.
53. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA § 58-607.1 (1947) (enacted 1975). This statute was
amended in 1987 to address an issue outside the scope of this case note. MONT. CODE ANN. §
27-1-702 (1989).
54. Dunham v. Southside Nat'l Bank, 169 Mont. 466, 473, 548 P.2d 1383, 1386-87
(1976).
55. Id.
56. Mihelich v. Butte Elec. Ry., 85 Mont. 604, 281 P. 540 (1929).
57. Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
226 [Vol. 51
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of conduct under comparative negligence as Wisconsin previously
had done in Bielski5 8
The Montana Supreme Court, however, refused to follow Wis-
consin case law and retained kinds of conduct under comparative
negligence.59 In the 1983 case of Derenberger v. Lutey,60 the court
cemented its retention of different kinds of conduct under compar-
ative negligence. The court held that the comparative-negligence
statute did not allow comparison of a plaintiff's ordinary negli-
gence and a defendant's willful or wanton conduct.6 1 Three years
later, the Montana Supreme Court limited the application of the
comparative-negligence statute to cases in which the plaintiff's and
defendant's conduct were of the same or similar kind.2
In March 1988, in Martel, the Montana Supreme Court ex-
pressly overruled the Derenberger interpretation of comparative
negligence,6 3 holding that a jury can compare all kinds of conduct
on the part of the plaintiff to all kinds of conduct on the part of
the defendant." After expressly straying from Wisconsin case law
for five years, Montana once again aligned itself with Wisconsin
precedent.
In another important way, however, the Martel court has re-
jected Wisconsin case law once again. The court concluded that
blindfolding jurors as to the effect of comparative negligence on a
verdict served no legitimate purpose.6 5 Moreover, the court rea-
soned that such blindfolding possibly fostered jury speculation
about, and manipulation of, a verdict.6 By reaching this conclu-
sion, the Montana Supreme Court rejected Wisconsin case law that
prohibited informing a jury as to the effect of comparative negli-
gence on a verdict. In so doing, the court has chosen a path never
before charted by Wisconsin.
The effect of eliminating the doctrine of kinds of negligence
and informing the jury as to the effect of comparative negligence
must be examined in detail before a conclusion as to the appropri-
ateness of the Montana Supreme Court's decision in Martel can be
evaluated.
58. Id.
59. Wollaston v. Burlington N. inc., 188 Mont. 192, 612 P.2d 1277 (1980).
60. Derenberger, 207 Mont. 1, 674 P.2d 485 (1983).
61. Id. at 4-5, 674 P.2d at 487.
62. Simonson v. White, 220 Mont. 14, 22, 713 P.2d 983, 988 (1986).
63. Martel, 231 Mont. 96, 99, 752 P.2d 140, 142 (1988).
64. Id. at 100, 752 P.2d at 142-43.
65. Id. at 105, 752 P.2d at 146.
66. Id.
7
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B. Elimination of Kinds of Conduct
A fundamental problem with the analysis of kinds of conduct
lies in the individual classifications themselves. The difficulty in
formulating standards or tests to differentiate between willful con-
duct, wanton misconduct, heedless conduct, gross negligence and
reckless conduct has led to inconsistent precedent at best. For ex-
ample, in Owens v. Parker Drilling Co., 7 the court held that a per-
son's conduct is willful, wanton or reckless "[w]hen a person knows
or has reason to know of the facts which create a high degree of
risk of harm to ... another, and either deliberately proceeds to act
in conscious disregard of . . . that risk, or recklessly proceeds in
unreasonable disregard of ... that risk." This definition of negli-
gence not only equates "willful," "wanton," and "reckless," but de-
fines these terms using words such as "knowing" and "intentional."
Interestingly, the court propounds this "carefully defined standard
of conduct" to remove confusion "generated by inconsistent use of
loosely defined terms such as willfulness, wantonness, recklessness,
gross negligence, and unjustifiable conduct. '68 This case demon-
strates the inherent difficulty in trying to slice negligence into sep-
arate and distinct kinds of conduct.
Prior to Martel, attempts to define different kinds of conduct
with ambiguous terms resulted in limited and unpredictable appli-
cation of Montana's comparative-negligence statute. Use of indefi-
nite kinds of conduct created a mechanism that allowed judicial
control over juries and facilitated the insertion of judicial discre-
tion into the decision-making process.
In Martel, the court based its decision on a resurrection of
Justice Gulbrandson's dissenting and specially concurring opinion
in Derenberger 9 In that opinion, Justice Gulbrandson called at-
tention to Montana's rule of statutory construction: the presump-
tion that when Montana borrows a statute from another state, it
also borrows the interpretation of that statute made by that state's
highest court.70
Because Montana borrowed Wisconsin's statute, Justice Gul-
brandson examined Wisconsin case law. In particular, Justice Gul-
brandson focused on the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in
Bielski.7 1 In Bielski, the court reasoned that under comparative
67. 207 Mont. 446, 451, 676 P.2d 162, 164 (1984).
68. Id.
69. Martel, 231 Mont. at 100, 752 P.2d at 142-43. See also Derenberger v. Lutey, 207
Mont. 1, 11, 674 P.2d 485, 490 (1983).
70. Derenberger, 207 Mont. at 11, 674 P.2d at 490.
71. Id. at 11-13, 674 P.2d at 490-91. See also Bielski, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105
[Vol. 51
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negligence, the rationale for disallowing the comparison of a plain-
tiff's ordinary negligence and a defendant's gross negligence no
longer existed.72 The Bielski court was the first court in the nation
to eliminate kinds of conduct in a comparative-negligence
jurisdiction.73
Comparative negligence brought a fault-based balance to a
system that, over time, had shifted from one extreme to another
with doctrines such as contributory negligence and kinds of con-
duct. As the court stated in Bielski, excepting kinds of conduct
from the comparative-negligence statute was contrary to the intent
of the doctrine itself, resulting in a system no longer based on
fault.74 For example, prior to Bielski, if a court deemed a plaintiff
negligent and a defendant grossly negligent, the court would not
consider the plaintiff's negligence, and the plaintiff would recover
100 percent. Bielski affords a more equitable solution by allowing
consideration of a plaintiff's negligence and a reduction in the
plaintiff's recovery based on his or her fault. 75 As a result, the
court will hold the plaintiff accountable for his or her negligent
conduct. No arbitrary ruling as to the kind of conduct the defend-
ant exhibited would allow a plaintiff full recovery when the jury
should be allowed to reduce a plaintiff's recovery according to his
or her percentage of negligence.
The problems associated with defining and applying different
kinds of conduct to comparative negligence necessitated aban-
doning kinds of conduct in Martel. Not only were the different
kinds of conduct ambiguous and unworkable, but the use of differ-
ent kinds of conduct under a comparative-negligence statute con-
flicted with the intent of comparative negligence, which is to allow
recovery based on the fault of both parties. The Montana Supreme
Court, by eliminating kinds of conduct, correctly expunged a rem-
nant from the days of contributory negligence. Therefore, Martel
liberates the Montana jury from judicial findings categorizing the
parties' conduct and allows the jury to compare all conduct.
C. Informing the Jury of the Effect of Comparative Negligence
Having reaffirmed its commitment to follow Wisconsin case
law by eliminating kinds of conduct, the Montana Supreme Court
(1962).
72. Bielski, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 17, 114 N.W.2d 105, 113. In Wisconsin, gross negligence in-
cludes reckless conduct and wanton conduct.
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in Martel then decided to venture into an area not explored by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court. Specifically, the court ruled that the
trial court should have informed the jury of the effect that compar-
ative negligence would have on the jury's verdict.76 By reaching
this conclusion, the court abandoned Wisconsin case law that ruled
against informing the jury77 and cast a strong vote of confidence in
favor of Montana juries.
In arriving at the decision to inform juries, the Montana Su-
preme Court relied upon its decision in Owens v. Parker Drilling
Co.78 The court concluded in Owens that Montana juries were able
to remain objective when deciding emotional cases.79 Emotional
cases involve facts that generate sympathy for the plaintiff. The
facts in Martel illustrate an emotional case in which a young man
experienced extreme emotional and physical pain that could have
elicited sympathy from a jury. Nonetheless, the jury in Martel re-
mained objective and denied the plaintiff recovery. This case dem-
onstrates that the Montana Supreme Court's confidence, as pos-
ited in Owens, was well placed.
The Montana Supreme Court further solidified the Owens
principle by refusing to overturn a holding in which the defendant,
on appeal, contended that opposing counsel was allowed to tell the
jury too much.80 In light of these decisions indicating the Montana
Supreme Court's increasing confidence in Montana juries, the rul-
ing in Martel is a natural extension of jury autonomy. Thus, the
Martel decision follows a developing trend toward informing a jury
of the effect of comparative negligence on a verdict. 1
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, initiated and still
leads the majority of jurisdictions opposed to informing a jury of
the effect of comparative negligence. 2 Despite criticism of blind-
folding the jury, the Wisconsin Supreme Court recently upheld its
long-standing rule against informing the jury in McGowan v.
Story.8 Relying heavily on the assumption that juries are easily
influenced by sympathy for an injured plaintiff, the McGowan
court reasoned that a jury-knowing the effect of comparative neg-
ligence-would manipulate its verdict to compensate an injured
76. Martel, 231 Mont. 96, 106, 752 P.2d 140, 145-46 (1988).
77. DeGroot v. Van Akkeren, 225 Wis. 105, 115, 273 N.W. 725, 729-30 (1937); Blahnik
v. Dax, 22 Wis. 2d 67, 76-77, 125 N.W.2d 364, 369 (1963).
78. Owens v. Parker Drilling Co., 207 Mont. 446, 676 P.2d 162 (1984).
79. Id. at 454, 676 P.2d at 166.
80. North v. Bunday, 226 Mont. 247, 258, 735 P.2d 270, 277 (1987).
81. H. WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT, § 18:2 (2d ed. 1987).
82. Id.
83. McGowan v. Story, 70 Wis. 2d 189, 234 N.W. 2d 325 (1975).
[Vol. 51
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plaintiff.8 4 However, assuming that jurors are more susceptible
than judges or lawyers to "sympathy, bias or prejudice, [contra-
dicts] our theory of government," which entrusts the people with
the power of self-governance." Not only is this assumption repug-
nant to principles of democracy, butlittle or no authority exists for
the frequently posited view that jurors are more emotional than
judges."' Before the proper role of the jury can be defined in the
justice system, unsupported recitation of assumptions about jury
sympathies and biases must give way to more critical analysis.
Arguments against informing juries also rest on the proposi-
tion that the average juror is unaware of comparative-negligence
law.8 7 One commentator, attempting to justify blindfolding juries,
has gone as far as to suggest that a court select unsophisticated
jurors.8  Logic and precedent contradict the suggestion that the
justice system would function better if decisions were left to unin-
formed juries."
The same commentator urges that a stern cautionary instruc-
tion against speculation will prevent the unsophisticated jury from
speculating.9 The commentator concludes, "The response that ju-
ries would ignore such cautionary instructions and continue to
speculate represents an unjustified distrust of jurors." '91 Appar-
ently, the commentator trusts an unsophisticated jury, but mis-
trusts jurors who may be able to think for themselves. The argu-
ments against informing juries of the effect of comparative
negligence generally are predicated on a mistrust of jury objectiv-
ity and a belief that the informed jury will manipulate its verdict.2
Recognizing that these arguments were without substantiation, the
Montana Supreme Court in Owens stated:
There are those who distrust the lay person's capacity for
reasoned and dispassionate judgment. There are those who toler-
ate the juries but feel compelled to hold tight rein lest the
wretched twelve break the bank. This judicial chauvinism will, if
not checked, inevitably erode the jury process.
84. Id. at 197, 234 N.W.2d at 329.
85. Ryan, Are Instructions Which Inform the Jury of the Effect of Their Answers
Inimical to Justice?, 1940 Wis. L. REV. 400, 401 (1940) [hereinafter Ryan].
86. Id. at 400.
87. Comment, INFORMING THE JURY OF THE LEGAL EFFECT OF SPECIAL VERDICT ANSWERS
IN COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS, 1981 DUKE L.J. 824, 841 (1981) [hereinafter Informing
the Jury].
88. Id. at 843.
89. See Smith v. Rorvik, 231 Mont. 85, 94-95, 751 P.2d 1053, 1058 (1988).
90. Informing the Jury, supra note 87, at 843.
91. Id.
92. Roman v. Mitchell, 82 N.J. 336, 341, 413 A.2d 322, 327 (1980).
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We feel that the parties' peers are best able to define and
measure justice.3
Average jurors probably are capable of understanding the ef-
fect of their verdict.9 4 Even if the jurors do not know the effect of
apportionment of negligence on a verdict, keeping them in the
dark will not prevent speculation about the results of a decision."
Even though uninformed that the plaintiff's percentage of negli-
gence would reduce his award, the Martel jury, nonetheless, sent
questions to the judge inquiring as to the effect the plaintiff's neg-
ligence would have on his award. Moreover, one need not view
such speculation with suspicion as the work of a result-oriented
jury. 7 Rather, jury speculation ensures that a jury's collective
sense of justice-not just the judge's sense of justice-is a"plied to
cases.
Uninformed juries, however, will deliberate blindly or with an
incorrect understanding of the law. Under a jury system, no valid
reason exists for denying jurors the information necessary to
render a just verdict.9 8 The possibility of error inherent in blind-
folding juries outweighs any perceived benefit.9 9 Thus, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court in Martel rightfully decided that a jury in-
structed on the effect of comparative negligence is best suited to
render a just verdict.
V. THE ROLE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES AFTER Martel
Punitive damages, by their nature, depend on the kind of con-
duct the defendant exhibited. A jurisdiction that has abolished this
dependence either must design a new mechanism to trigger the
award of punitive damages or abolish punitive damages in compar-
ative-negligence cases. The Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that
abolition of kinds of conduct eliminates "the basis for punitive
damages in negligence cases. But punitive damages are given, not
to compensate the plaintiff for his injury, but to punish and deter
the tortfeasor "0.... 01 By eliminating kinds of conduct, the Wis-
consin court abolished the mechanism for determining whether pu-
93. Owens, 207 Mont. at 454, 676 P.2d at 166 (emphasis added).
94. Ryan, supra note 85, at 404.
95. Thomas v. Board of Township Trustees, 224 Kan. 539, 551, 582 P.2d 271, 280
(1978).
96. Martel, 231 Mont. at 105, 752 P.2d at 146.
97. Informing the Jury, supra note 87, at 842.
98. Simpson v. Anderson, 33 Colo. App. 134, 136, 517 P.2d 416, 418-19 (1973).
99. See generally Ryan, supra note 85.
100. Bielski, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 18, 114 N.W.2d at 113.
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nitive damages are appropriate. The court, however, indicated that
because punitive damages differed in kind from compensatory
damages, Bielski did not abolish punitive damages altogether.
In 1980, the Wisconsin Supreme Court refined the Bielski
holding when it held that a jury could award punitive damages
under comparative negligence if the defendant's conduct were
deemed "outrageous." 10' The court reiterated that the main hold-
ing of Bielski abolished kinds of conduct in comparative-negli-
gence cases, but did not abolish punitive damages.' °0 Unfortu-
nately, the court was forced to revive a classification of conduct,
specifically outrageous conduct, to enable a plaintiff to recover pu-
nitive damages. 0 3 The Wisconsin Supreme Court indicated that
"outrageous" conduct is a high standard, but-as with all artificial
classifications-the standard will need to be fleshed out in case law
before its inherent ambiguity can be defined.
Creating a precise standard for evaluating the defendant's
conduct, however, probably will prove futile, like the previous ef-
fort to define kinds of conduct. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in
1928 recognized that "[a]ny exact and precise definition of the
technical term in law of the 'malice' that must be shown in order
that there may be a basis for punitory damages ... is hard to find,
and still harder to frame."'0 4 Despite this recognition, the Wiscon-
sin court appears unwilling to abandon classification of the con-
duct needed to justify an award of punitive damages.
Though the Wisconsin Supreme Court attempts to define
levels of conduct, the Montana Supreme Court should reject this
approach. In line with the Martel decision, the jury should be al-
lowed to determine the appropriateness of punitive damages. The
court's role would entail only modifying clearly erroneous awards
of punitive damages, or those awards which are not supported by
the facts or circumstances and are likely a result of passion or
prejudice. Under this test, the primary role of determining puni-
tive damages would shift to the jury. Such a shift would be consis-
tent with the Montana Supreme Court's demonstration of confi-
dence in juries, as evidenced in Martel, and would allow the court
to oversee this process.
VI. CONCLUSION
In deciding Martel, the Montana Supreme Court demon-
101. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 271, 294 N.W.2d 437, 446 (1980).
102. Id. at 272-77, 294 N.W.2d at 444-47.
103. Id. at 271, 294 N.W.2d at 446.
104. Meshane v. Second St. Co., 197 Wis. 382, 387, 222 N.W. 320, 322 (1928).
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strated its confidence in Montana juries. By eliminating the appli-
cation of kinds of conduct to Montana's comparative-negligence
statute, the court realigned itself with Wisconsin precedent. Addi-
tionally, the abolition of arbitrary classifications of conduct re-
moved a remnant of contributory negligence and clarified the ap-
plication of the doctrine of comparative-negligence to all
negligence cases. The Montana Supreme Court's decision to inform
juries of the effect of comparative negligence rightfully granted
further autonomy to the jury in its deliberations and signaled the
court's faith in the jury system. Finally, the Montana Supreme
Court must now decide the role of punitive damages under com-
parative negligence. Punitive damages should not be abolished, but
in determining standards for applying punitive damages, the court
should avoid reviving ambiguous classifications of negligent con-
duct. The Montana Supreme Court should allow juries to decide
when punitive damages are appropriate, thereby reducing the
court's intervention into the comparative-negligence sphere and
further investing its trust in Montana juries.
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